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Abstract
AGM’s belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the
study of belief change operations. In this context, belief
bases (prioritised bases) have been largely used to specify
the agent’s belief state - whether representing the agent’s ‘ex-
plicit beliefs’ or as a computational model for her belief state.
While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and
their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been stud-
ied before, few works considered how well-known postulates
from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by
means of belief bases and their counterpart in a dynamic epis-
temic logic. This work investigates how priority graphs, a
syntactic representation of preference relations deeply con-
nected to prioritised bases, can be used to characterise belief
change operators, focusing on well-known postulates of It-
erated Belief Change. We provide syntactic representations
of belief change operators in a dynamic context, as well as
new negative results regarding the possibility of representing
an iterated belief revision operation using transformations on
priority graphs.
Introduction
One of the most influential models for be-
lief change is the so-called AGM paradigm,
named after the authors of the seminal work
(Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985). Although
the AGM’s approach has brought profound developments
for the problem of belief dynamics, influencing areas such
as Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence, and Philoso-
phy, it has not been immune to criticism (Hansson 1992;
Rott 2000; Darwiche and Pearl 1997).
Particularly, Hansson (1992) criticises the use of deduc-
tively closed sets of formulas in the AGM paradigm, provid-
ing examples for which not just the meaning, but also the
structure of the beliefs explicitly held by an agent may influ-
ence the change. This author proceeds to construct a differ-
ent notion of belief revision, which became known as Belief
Base Change, relying on the structure of the information be-
lieved by the agent.
While many studies (Nebel 1991; Williams 1994;
Williams 1995; Rott 2009) propose belief change operators
based on the syntactic structure of an agent’s explicit beliefs,
or on the syntactic representation of an agent’s belief state,
few formal connections have been established between be-
lief change postulates and these belief base change operators
- some examples of works that investigate such connection
are (Hansson 1994; Ferme´, Krevneris, and Reis 2008;
Ferme´, Garapa, and Reis 2017). The axiomatic characteri-
sation of syntactic-based belief change, however, has been
concentrated on the one-shot behaviour of these operations
and, thus, are not able to clarify their iterated or dynamic
behaviour.
Belief base change operators are iterated, in the sense
that they result in changing the belief state of the agent
itself (Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003). As such, it is
necessary to establish which formal properties these change
operations satisfy on a dynamic sense, as studied in the liter-
ature of Iterated Belief Change (Darwiche and Pearl 1997;
Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003;
Jin and Thielscher 2007).
A step into connecting belief change operators and be-
lief base change operators has been achieved by the work of
Rott (2009) and Liu (2011) which show that several belief
change operations can be defined using transformations on
some form of prioritised belief bases called priority graphs.
Souza et al. (2016), on the other hand, provide examples of
belief change operations which cannot be defined in such a
way.
While these latter works focus on using syntactic rep-
resentations to construct belief change operations, they do
not provide a strong connection between the syntactic-based
transformations provided and the formal properties of the
belief change operations they represent. To our knowledge,
there is no proposed characterisation in the literature of iter-
ated belief change postulates based on syntactic representa-
tions of an agent’s belief base.
In this work, we study the relationship between iterated
belief change postulates and properties of belief base change
operators based on the counterpart of these operators as
transformations on Liu’s priority graphs (2011). We obtain
constraints on belief base change operators that guarantee
satisfaction of some important postulates in the area of Iter-
ated Belief Change.
We also show the limits of expressibility of belief change
operators by means of changes in belief bases. These neg-
ative results provide us with a deeper understanding of the
connections between belief base change and iterated belief
change, helping to delineate the limits of the correspondence
between semantic and syntactic theories of dynamic belief
change.
This work is structured as follows: we start discussing
the background knowledge in the next cection. Then, we
study how iterated belief change postulates can be charac-
terised through transformations on priority graphs. Further,
we show how our results can be used to construct syntactic
representations of an iterated belief change operation, and in
Section Negative Results we present some impossibility re-
sults for this characterisation. Finally, we discuss the related
literature and present some final considerations.
Background
Much work has been conducted investigating syn-
tactic representations of the explicit beliefs of an
agent (Hansson 1992; Williams 1994; Rott 2009;
De Jongh and Liu 2009; Baltag, Fiutek, and Smets 2016).
It is well-known that an agent’s belief state - usually
represented by a preference relation among worlds - can
also be syntactically represented by means of orders among
sentences, as well-investigated by Lafage and Lang (2005).
We start by introducing the syntactic representations we
will use in this work to encode an agent’s belief base. This
structure, known as a priority graph, or P-graph for short,
was proposed by Liu (2009; 2011) and was further devel-
oped by Van Benthem, Grossi and Liu (2014), and Souza et
al (2016). We will also present their relation to preference
models - a generalisation of the models used in the area of
belief revision to encode an agent’s belief state. With this
connection, we will be able to characterise well-known pos-
tulates of iterated belief revision using operations on priority
graphs, thus connecting belief base change operations and
iterated belief revision.
Definition 1. (Liu 2011) Let P be a countable set of propo-
sitional symbols andL0(P ) the language of classical propo-
sitional sentences over the set P . A P-graph is a tuple
G = 〈Φ,≺〉 where Φ ⊂ L0(P ), is a set of propositional
sentences and ≺ is a strict partial order on Φ.
Given a non-empty set of possible worldsW and a valua-
tion of propositional symbols over worlds ofW , the order≺
of a P-graph can be lifted to an order on worlds. Such an or-
dering can be called a preference (or a plausibility) relation.
Definition 2. (Liu 2011) LetG = 〈Φ,≺〉 be a P-graph, and
v : P → 2W be a valuation function of propositions over a
non-empty setW of possible worlds. The preference relation
≤G onW induced by P-graphG is defined as follows:
w ≤G w
′ iff ∀ϕ ∈ Φ : ((w′  ϕ⇒ w  ϕ) or
∃ψ ∈ Φ : ψ ≺ ϕ, w  ψ, and w′ 6 ψ)
More yet, if a P-graph G is finite,
Van Benthem, Grossi, and Liu (2014) have shown that
a preference relation ≤G, defined as above, satisfies well-
foundedness - a property deeply connected with Lewis
Limit Assumption, commonly required for semantic models
of an agent’s belief state.
It is worthy of notice that preference relations
are a common semantic representation of an agents
belief state. In fact, in Belief Revision Theory
(Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985), an im-
portant semantic representation of agents belief states was
proposed by Adam Grove, which is commonly known as
Grove’s systems of spheres (SOS) (Grove 1988), or simply
as Grove’s spheres.
A generalisation of Grove’s spheres was given by Gi-
rard (2008), called preference models or order mod-
els, in the context of Preference Logic. Similar mod-
els have been proposed before in the context of Qualita-
tive Decision Theory (Boutilier 1994), Non-monotonic Rea-
soning (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990), among oth-
ers. These models have been applied to the study of
Dynamic Belief Revision by the work of Baltag and
Smets (Baltag and Smets 2008), Girard and Rott (2014),
Liu (2011), and Souza et al. (2016; 2017) and proved to
be an expressible model for an agent’s belief state. In this
work, we will adopt Souza’s (2016) definition of preference
models - which requires the preference relation ≤ to have a
well-founded strict part.
Definition 3. (Souza 2016) A preference model is a tuple
M = 〈W,≤, v〉 where W is a set of possible worlds, ≤ is
a reflexive, transitive relation over W with a well-founded
strict part, and v : P → 2W a valuation function.
From the above definitions, it is easy to see that from a
P-graph we can construct a preference model by taking the
preference relation induced by such a graph.
Definition 4. Let G = 〈Φ,≺〉 be a P-graph and let M =
〈W,≤, v〉 be a preference model. We sayM is induced byG
iff ≤=≤G.
The induction of preference models from P-graphs raises
the question about the relations between these two struc-
tures. Liu (2011) shows that any finite model with a reflex-
ive and transitive accessibility relation has an equivalent P-
graph.
Theorem 5. (Liu 2011) LetM = 〈W,R〉 be a mono-modal
Kripke structure. The following two statements are equiva-
lent:
1. The relation R is reflexive and transitive;
2. There is a priority graph G = (Φ,≺) and a valuation v
s.t. ∀w,w′ ∈W. wRw′ iff w ≤G w′.
It is well-known from work on Iterated
Belief Revision (Darwiche and Pearl 1997;
Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003) that dynamic be-
lief change operations can be described by a transformation
in the agent’s belief state.
As such, we can define dynamic belief change op-
erators using the following notion of dynamic opera-
tors on preference models, where M(L≤(P )) is the class
of all preference models for a logic language L≤(P )
(Souza, Moreira, and Vieira 2017):
Definition 6. (Souza, Moreira, and Vieira 2017) Let
⋆ : M(L≤(P ))× L0(P )→M(L≤(P )), we say ⋆ is a dy-
namic operator on preference models if for any preference
model M = 〈W,≤, v〉 and formula ϕ ∈ L0, we have that
⋆(M,ϕ) = 〈W,≤⋆, v〉. In other words, an operation on
preference models is called a dynamic operator iff it only
changes the relation of preference models.
Liu et al (2011; 2014) shows that these dynamic belief
changes can also be described by means of changes in the
priority graphs representing the agent’s belief base. In the
following,G(P ) denotes the set of all P-graphs constructed
over a set P of propositional symbols.
Definition 7. We call a P-graph transformation any function
† : G(P )× L0(P ) → G(P ).
A P-graph transformation is, thus, a transformation in the
agent’s belief base, as represented by a priority graph.
Since P-graphs and preference models are translatable
into one another, it is easy to connect P-graph transforma-
tions and dynamic operators as well.
Definition 8. Let ⋆ : M(L≤(P ))× L0(P ) →M(L≤(P ))
be a dynamic operator and † : G(P )× L0(P ) → G(P ) be
a P-graph transformation. We say ⋆ is induced by † if for
any preference model M ∈M(L≤(P )) and any P-graph
G ∈ G(P ), ifM is induced by G then the preference model
⋆(M,ϕ) is induced by the P-graph †(G,ϕ), where ϕ is any
propositional formula in L0(P ),
Notice that not all P-graph transformations induce dy-
namic operators.We say that syntactically different P-graphs
are equivalent if they induce the same preference model.
As such, if a P-graph transformation changes equivalent P-
graphs in inconsistent ways, no dynamic operator can satisfy
the condition of Definition 8.
For example, consider a P-graph transformation that
changes the P-graph p ≺ q into the P-graph p ≺ q, and
changes the P-graph p ∧ q ≺ p ∧ ¬q ≺ ¬p ∧ q ≺ ¬p ∧ ¬q
into p∧q ≺ ¬p∧q ≺ p∧¬q ≺ ¬p∧¬q. Such a transforma-
tion cannot induce any dynamic operator since the original
P-graphs are equivalent, i.e., induce the same models, but
the resulting P-graphs are not. As such, we define the notion
of relevant graph transformation.
Definition 9. We say that a be a P-graph transformation † is
relevant if there is some dynamic operator ⋆ that is induced
by it.
Notice that, the existence of relevant P-graph transfor-
mations is guaranteed by the previous representation results
of Liu (2011) and Van Benthem, Grossi, and Liu (2014) on
the characterisation of some dynamic operators by means of
changes in P-graphs.
Priority Changes Satisfying Postulates for
Iterated Belief Changes
In this work, we investigate the connection between the
properties satisfied by dynamic belief change operations, fo-
cusing on the postulates studied in the field of Iterated Belief
Revision, and the properties satisfied by the P-graph trans-
formations that encode these operations. We aim to under-
stand better which belief change operations can or cannot
be encoded this way and, thus, the differences between dy-
namic belief change based on semantic models and based on
syntactic representations.
As such, the main results of our work can be stated as the
characterisations provided in Propositions 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
and 16, as well as the negative results provided in Fact 21
and Corollary 23. An interesting application of these results
will be obtained in the next Section, in which we construct
a P-graph transformation to implement the operation of
lexicographic revision (Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003)
and obtain, as a corollary, the harmony result proved by
Van Benthem, Grossi, and Liu (2014) stating the correctness
of this transformation.
The use of postulates to encode rational constraints in
the way an agent must change her beliefs is a defining
characteristic of the AGM approach to Belief Revision
(Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985). These pos-
tulates, however, are usually defined by means of constraints
on changes in the agent’s belief state, thus, in our case, on
preference models. We must, then, define what it means for
a P-graph transformation to satisfy some postulate (or prop-
erty) for belief change operators.
Definition 10. We say that a P-graph transformation † sat-
isfies a postulate P if (i) † is relevant and (ii) any dynamic
operator ⋆ induced by † satisfies postulate P .
AGM belief revision says very little about how to change
one agent’s beliefs repeatedly. In fact, it has been observed
that the AGM approach allows some counter-intuitive be-
haviour in the iterated case (Darwiche and Pearl 1997). As a
result, different authors have proposed additional postulates
that encode rational ways to change one’s beliefs in an iter-
ated way.
Most famous among them is the work of Darwiche and
Pearl (1997). They propose a set of postulates known as the
DP postulates for iterated revision. Let S = 〈W,≤〉 be a
SOS and S′ = 〈W,≤∗ϕ〉 the result of revising the SOS S by
a formula ϕ, the DP postulates can be stated as:
(DP-1) If w,w′ ∈ JϕK, then w ≤∗ϕ w′ iff w ≤ w′
(DP-2) If w,w′ 6∈ JϕK, then w ≤∗ϕ w′ iff w ≤ w′
(DP-3) Ifw∈JϕK andw′ 6∈JϕK, thenw<w′⇒w <∗ϕ w′
(DP-4) Ifw∈JϕK andw′ 6∈JϕK, thenw≤w′⇒w ≤∗ϕ w′
We want to provide a set of constraints on P-graph trans-
formations that guarantee that the dynamic operators in-
duced by them satisfy these postulates. With that, we wish
to study the connections between the classes of belief base
revision operations and iterated belief change operators.
Let us start with DP-1. The postulate DP-1 states that for
any two worlds w,w′ satisfying ϕ, there is no reason for
their relative order to change in the agent’s belief state af-
ter revision. In terms of P-graphs, this means that for any
formula that w′ satisfies in the changed priority graph, ei-
ther w must also satisfy it, or there must be a formula that is
preferred to it and that w satisfies. We can ensure this prop-
erty guaranteeing that the resulting P-graph is related to the
original by a set of constraints in how it must be changed.
Proposition 11. Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a
relevant P-graph transformation. If, for any P-graph G =
〈Φ,≺〉 and propositional formula ϕ ∈ L0(P ), the P-graph
†(G,ϕ) = 〈Φ†,≺†〉 satisfies the conditions below, then †
satisfies DP-1:
1. For all ξ ∈ Φ, there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ† s.t.
(a) ϕ ∧ ξ ≡ ϕ ∧ ξ′ and
(b) ∀ψ′ ∈ Φ†, if ψ′ ≺† ξ′ then
ψ′ ≡ ϕ or
there is ψ ∈ Φ s.t. ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ϕ ∧ ψ′ and ψ ≺ ξ;
2. For all ξ ∈ Φ†, ξ ≡ ϕ or there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ s.t.
(a) ϕ ∧ ξ ≡ ϕ ∧ ξ′ and
(b) ∀ψ′ ∈ Φ, if ψ′ ≺ ξ′ then there is ψ ∈ Φ† s.t.
ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ϕ ∧ ψ′ and
ψ ≺† ξ.
Proof. By Definition 10 we have to prove that any dy-
namic operator ⋆ induced by † satisfies the postulate DP-1 .
Let † be a P-graph transformation satisfying the conditions
above, ⋆ a dynamic operator induced by †, M = 〈W,≤, v〉
a preference model, and ϕ ∈ L0 a propositional formula.
Also given M⋆ϕ = ⋆(M,ϕ) = 〈W,≤⋆ϕ, v〉, take a P-graph
G = 〈Φ,≺〉 inducing M s.t. †(G,ϕ) = 〈Φ†,≺†〉 induces
⋆(M,ϕ).
⇐:
Take w,w′ ∈ JϕKM such that w ≤⋆ϕ w′, and take ξ ∈ Φ
such that M,w′  ξ - notice that the case in which no such
formula exists is trivial, since necessarily w ≤ w′ in such
case. ThenM⋆ϕ, w
′
 ξ, since ξ is propositional formula.
Since ξ ∈ Φ then, by condition 1(a), there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ†
s.t. ϕ ∧ ξ ≡ ϕ ∧ ξ′. As such, M⋆ϕ, w′  ξ′, given that ⋆ is
induced by †. As w ≤⋆ϕ w′, either:
(i)M⋆ϕ, w  ξ
′, or
(ii) there is some ψ′ ∈ Φ† s.t. ψ′ ≺† ξ′,M⋆ϕ, w  ψ′ and
M⋆ϕ, w
′ 6 ψ′. Hence, by condition 1 (b), there is some
ψ ∈ Φ s.t. ϕ∧ψ ≡ ϕ∧ψ′ and ψ ≺ ξ. As suchM,w  ψ
andM,w′ 6 ψ.
From (i) and (ii) we conclude that w ≤ w′
⇒: Similar to the case before. Take w,w′ ∈ JϕKM s.t.
w ≤ w′ and ξ ∈ Φ†, use condition 2 to conclude that
w ≤⋆ϕ w′.
The postulate DP-2 describes the same information as
DP-1, only restricted to those worlds that do not satisfy ϕ.
As such, we can provide a similar characterisation.
Proposition 12. Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a
relevant P-graph transformation. If, for any P-graph G =
〈Φ,≺〉 and propositional formula ϕ ∈ L0(P ), the P-graph
†(G,ϕ) = 〈Φ†,≺†〉 satisfies the conditions below, then †
satisfies DP-2 :
1. For all ξ ∈ Φ, there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ† s.t.
(a) ¬ϕ ∧ ξ ≡ ¬ϕ ∧ ξ′ and
(b) ∀ψ ∈ Φ, if ψ ≺ ξ then there is ψ′ ∈ Φ† s.t.
i. ¬ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∧ ψ′ and
ii. ψ′ ≺† ξ′;
2. For all ξ ∈ Φ†, ξ ≡ ϕ or there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ s.t.
(a) ¬ϕ ∧ ξ ≡ ¬ϕ ∧ ξ′ and
(b) ∀ψ ∈ Φ†, if ψ ≺† ξ then
ψ ≡ ϕ or
there is ψ′ ∈ Φ s.t. ¬ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∧ ψ′ and ψ′ ≺ ξ′.
Proof. Similar to that of Proposition 11.
The postulate DP-3 states that for any two worlds w sat-
isfying ϕ and w′ not satisfying it, after revision by ϕ, if w
was preferable to w′ then it must continue to be so in the
agent’s belief state. In terms of P-graphs, we can guarantee
this condition requiring that, if there was a formula in the
original P-graph that w satisfied and w′ did not, there must
be a formula in the revised P-graph s.t. w satisfies and w′
does not. Therefore, we can characterise DP-3.
Proposition 13. Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a
relevant P-graph transformation. If, for any P-graph G =
〈Φ,≺〉 and propositional formula ϕ ∈ L0(P ), the P-graph
†(G,ϕ) = 〈Φ†,≺†〉 satisfies the condition below, then † sat-
isfies DP-3 :
• For all ξ ∈ Φ or there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ† s.t.
(a) ϕ ∧ ξ ⊢ ξ′,
(b) ¬ϕ ∧ ξ′ ⊢ ξ, and
(c) ∀ψ′ ∈ Φ†, if ψ′ ≺† ξ′ then ψ′ ≡ ϕ or there is ψ ∈ Φ
s.t. ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ′, ¬ϕ ∧ ψ′ ⊢ ψ and ψ ≺ ξ.
Proof. Let † be a P-graph transformation satisfying the con-
ditions above, ⋆ a dynamic operator induced by †, M =
〈W,≤, v〉 a preference model and ϕ ∈ L0(P ) a proposi-
tional formula. Also givenM⋆ϕ = ⋆(M,ϕ) = 〈W,≤⋆ϕ, v〉,
take G = 〈Φ,≺〉 be a P-graph inducing M s.t. †(G,ϕ) =
〈Φ†,≺†〉 induces ⋆(M,ϕ).
Take w,w′ ∈ W s.t.M,w  ϕ,M,w′ 6 ϕ and w < w′.
From w < w′ we conclude that there is some ξ ∈ Φ s.t.
M,w  ξ, M,w′ 6 ξ and for all ∀ψ ≺ ξ, if M,w′  ψ
then M,w  ψ. Since ξ ∈ Φ, there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ† s.t.
ϕ∧ ξ ⊢ ξ′, ¬ϕ∧ ξ′ ⊢ ξ. As suchM⋆ϕ, w  ξ′,M⋆ϕ, w′ 6 ξ
and for all ψ′ ≺† ξ′, ifM⋆ϕ, w′  ψ′ then there is ψ ∈ Φ s.t.
ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ′, ¬ϕ ∧ ψ′ ⊢ ψ and ψ ≺ ξ. As such M,w′  ψ
and, thus,M,w  ψ. Since ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ′, thenM⋆ϕ, w  ψ′,
thus w ≺† w′.
Along the same lines, as we did for DP-3, we can charac-
terise postulate DP-4.
Proposition 14. Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a
relevant P-graph transformation. If, for any P-graph G =
〈Φ,≺〉 and propositional formula ϕ ∈ L0(P ), the P-graph
†(G,ϕ) = 〈Φ†,≺†〉 satisfies the condition below, then † sat-
isfies DP-4 :
• For all ξ ∈ Φ†, ξ ≡ ϕ or there is some ξ′ ∈ Φ s.t.
(a) ϕ ∧ ξ′ ⊢ ξ,
(b) ¬ϕ ∧ ξ ⊢ ξ′, and
(c) ∀ψ′ ∈ Φ, if ψ′ ≺ ξ′ then there isψ ∈ Φ† s.t.ϕ∧ψ′ ⊢ ψ,
¬ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ′ and ψ ≺ ξ.
Proof. Let † be a P-graph transformation satisfying the con-
ditions above, ⋆ a dynamic operator induced by †, M =
〈W,≤, v〉 a preference model, and ϕ ∈ L0(P ) a proposi-
tional formula. Also givenM⋆ϕ = ⋆(M,ϕ) = 〈W,≤⋆ϕ, v〉,
take G = 〈Φ,≺〉 be a P-graph inducing M s.t. †(G,ϕ) =
〈Φ†,≺†〉 induces ⋆(M,ϕ).
Take w,w′ ∈ W s.t.M,w  ϕ,M,w′ 6 ϕ, and w ≤ w′.
Take ξ ∈ Φ† s.t. M,w′  ξ. There is some ξ′ ∈ Φ s.t.
ϕ ∧ ξ′ ⊢ ξ, ¬ϕ ∧ ξ ⊢ ξ′. As such,M,w′  ξ′.
Since w ≤ w′, either (i) M,w  ξ′ or (ii) there is some
ψ′ ≺ ξ′ s.t. M,w  ψ′ s.t. M,w′ 6 ψ′. From (ii), we con-
clude that there is some ψ ∈ Φ† s.t. ψ ≺ ξ, ϕ ∧ ψ′ ⊢ ψ,
and ¬ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ′. Since ¬ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ′ andM,w′ 6 ψ′, we
conclude that M,w′ 6 ψ and, thus, M⋆ϕ, w′ 6 ψ, as ψ is
a propositional formula. From (i) and (ii) we conclude that
w ≤⋆ϕ w′.
We know that the operation of lexicographic revision
(Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003) can be defined by
means of transformations on P-graphs (Liu 2011). Also,
Nayak et al. (2003) have shown that the operation of lexi-
cographic revision is completely characterized by the pos-
tulates DP-1, DP-2, and the following postulate known as
Recalcitrance (REC).
(REC) If w ∈ JϕK and w′ 6∈ JϕK, then w <∗ϕ w′.
As such, it is expected that we can characterise REC as
well. Postulate REC requires for any world satisfying ϕ to be
preferred to those not satisfying it. This requirement can be
easily guaranteed if all the minimal elements of the changed
P-graph which express relevant information (i.e., not equiv-
alent to ⊥ nor ⊤) imply ϕ.
Proposition 15. Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a
relevant P-graph transformation. If, for any P-graph G =
〈Φ,≺〉 and propositional formula ϕ ∈ L0(P ), the P-graph
†(G,ϕ) = 〈Φ†,≺†〉 satisfies the condition below, then † sat-
isfies REC:
• For all ξ ∈ Φ†, either ξ ≡ ⊤, ξ ≡ ⊥, ξ ⊢ ϕ or there is
some ψ ∈ Φ† s.t. ψ ≺† ξ, ψ 6≡ ⊥ and ψ ⊢ ϕ;
• There is some ξ ∈ Φ s.t. ξ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. It is immediate that if a graph transformation satis-
fies the condition above, the induced dynamic operator must
satisfy REC since any world satisfying ϕ in a model induced
by such a graph would be preferred over any world not sat-
isfying ϕ.
Since DP-3 and DP-4 can be characterised by means of
transformations on P-graphs, it is expected that a related
postulate might be as well. The postulate of Independence
below, proposed by Jin and Thielscher (2007) and indepen-
dently by Booth and Meyer (2006), states that a revision op-
eration may not create arbitrary conditional beliefs in the
agent’s belief state.
(IND) If w∈JϕK and w′ 6∈JϕK, then w≤w′ ⇒ w <∗ϕ w′.
The postulate IND is, in fact, a stronger form of both DP-3
and DP-4. As such, we can provide the following charac-
terisation for it, based on the characterisation of DP-3 and
DP-4.
Proposition 16. Let † : G(P ) × L0(P ) → G(P ) be a
relevant P-graph transformation. If, for any P-graph G =
〈Φ,≺〉 and propositional formula ϕ ∈ L0(P ), the P-graph
†(G,ϕ) = 〈Φ†,≺†〉 satisfies the condition below, then † sat-
isfies IND:
• For all ξ′ ∈ Φ†, ξ′ ≡ ϕ or there is some ξ ∈ Φ s.t.
(a) ϕ ∧ ξ ⊢ ξ′,
(b) ¬ϕ ∧ ξ′ ⊢ ξ, and
(c) ∀ψ′ ∈ Φ†, if ψ′ ≺† ξ′ then there is ψ ∈ Φ s.t. ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢
ψ′, ¬ϕ ∧ ψ′ ⊢ ψ and ψ ≺ ξ.
(d) if ξ′ 6⊢ ϕ, there is some ψ′ ≺† ξ′ s.t. ψ′ ≡ ϕ
Proof. Let † be a P-graph transformation satisfying the con-
ditions above, ⋆ a dynamic operator induced by †, M =
〈W,≤, v〉 a preference model and ϕ ∈ L0(P ) a proposi-
tional formula. Also givenM⋆ϕ = ⋆(M,ϕ) = 〈W,≤⋆ϕ, v〉,
take G = 〈Φ,≺〉 be a P-graph inducing M s.t. †(G,ϕ) =
〈Φ†,≺†〉 induces ⋆(M,ϕ).
Take w,w′ ∈ W s.t.M,w  ϕ,M,w′ 6 ϕ and w ≤ w′.
Take ξ ∈ Φ† s.t. M,w′  ξ. There is some ξ′ ∈ Φ s.t.
ϕ ∧ ξ′ ⊢ ξ, ¬ϕ ∧ ξ ⊢ ξ′. As such,M,w′  ξ′.
Since w ≤ w′, either (i) M,w  ξ′ or (ii) there is some
ψ′ ≺ ξ′ s.t. M,w  ψ′ and M,w′ 6 ψ′. As such, there is
ψ ∈ Φ† s.t. ψ ≺ ξ, ϕ ∧ ψ′ ⊢ ψ, and ¬ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ′. Since
¬ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ′ andM,w′ 6 ψ′, we conclude thatM,w′ 6 ψ
and, thus, M⋆ϕ, w
′ 6 ψ, as ψ is a propositional formula.
Further, since M,w′  ξ′, then ξ′ 6⊢ ϕ. As such, there is
someψ′ ≡ ϕ. We conclude that (iii)M,w′ 6 ψ′ andM,w 
ψ′. From (i), (ii), and (iii), we conclude that w <⋆ϕ w
′.
Deriving P-Graph Transformations from
Belief Revision Policies
The results obtained above can be used to analyse any
syntax-based belief revision policy (P-graph transforma-
tions) and derive which belief revision properties (or pos-
tulates) it satisfies. On the other hand, these results can also
be used to derive implementations for a belief revision op-
erator based on P-graphs. To illustrate this last point, let us
examine the case of Lexicographic Revision.
Definition 17. (Girard 2008) LetM = 〈W,≤, v〉 be a pref-
erence model and ϕ a formula of L0(P ). We say the prefer-
ence model M⇑ϕ = 〈W,≤⇑ϕ, v〉 is the result of the lexico-
graphic revision ofM by ϕ, where
w ≤⇑ϕ w
′ iff


w ≤ w′ if w,w′ ∈ JϕK or
w ≤ w′ if w,w′ 6∈ JϕK or
True if w ∈ JϕK and w′ 6∈ JϕK
The operation above consists of making each world satis-
fying ϕ to be strictly more preferable than those not satisfy-
ing it, while maintaining the order otherwise.
It is well-known (Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003)
that lexicographic revision is completely characterized by
the postulates (DP-1), (DP-2) and (REC). Hence, using
Propositions 11, 12 and 15, we can construct a P-graph
transformation that satisfies these postulates.
A simple P-graph transformation that does satisfy Propo-
sitions 11, 12, and 15 is prefixing which was pro-
posed by Van Benthem (2009) based on the work of
Andre´ka, Ryan, and Schobbens (2002).
Definition 18. The prefixing of a P-graph G = 〈Φ,≺〉
by a propositional formula ϕ ∈ L0(P ) is the P-graph
; (G,ϕ) = 〈Φ ∪ {ϕ},≺;ϕ〉, usually denoted by ϕ;G , where
≺;ϕ = ≺ ∪ {〈ϕ, ψ〉 | ψ ∈ Φ}
Observe that the resulting P-graph maintains all formu-
las of Φ, thus satisfying Propositions 11 and 12, and in-
cludes a formula ϕ (or equivalent to it) that is preferred to
all formulas in Φ, thus satisfying Proposition 15. As such,
the dynamic operator induced by P-graph prefixing satisfies
(DP-1), (DP-2) and (REC). Since these three postulates com-
pletely characterize lexicographic revision, we conclude the
following.
Corollary 19. Let M be a preference model induced by a
P-graph G and ϕ a propositional formula. The modelM⇑ϕ
is induced by the P-graph ϕ;G.
Negative Results
While the previous results are encouraging, Souza et
al. (2016) already showed that some belief change opera-
tors cannot be defined with P-graphs. As such, it must be the
case that some postulates in the area cannot be represented
by means of transformations on P-graphs - or at least not in a
way in which it is jointly consistent with other postulates. To
prove such a result, those authors show a simple fact about
priority graphs: they cannot encode all the information about
the models they induce.
Fact 20. (Souza et al. 2016) LetG = 〈Φ,≺〉 a P-graph and
ϕ a propositional formula. There is no propositional formula
µϕ s.t. for every modelM = 〈W,≤G, v〉 induced by G and
all w ∈ W , w  µϕ iff w ∈ Min≤GJϕK.
Fact 20 above provides us with some clues to investigate
which postulates cannot be characterised through transfor-
mations on priority graphs, namely those that refer directly
to the minimal worlds of a model.
One trivial example of such a postulate is the property of
an iterated belief change operator to be faithful to AGM’s
postulates (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985),
known as postulate FAITH below.
(FAITH) If JϕK 6=∅ then w∈Min≤JϕK iff w∈ Min≤∗ϕW
Notice that while FAITH says something about the mini-
mal worlds of a model, it does not characterise this set in any
way. To illustrate it, it suffices to realise that lexicographic
contraction satisfies FAITH - which describes the change in
the agent’s belief state by changing the preference of all the
worlds satisfying a certain propositional formulaϕ. As such,
if a P-graph transformation satisfies the postulates DP-1 and
REC then it satisfies the postulate FAITH.
Let us then consider some belief change operators requir-
ing a characterisation of the changes in the belief state which
is completely dependent on some set of minimal worlds. To
construct such an operator, let us examine the postulate of
Conditional Belief Change Minimisation (CB), proposed by
Boutilier (1993). This postulate states that any iterated belief
revision operation must minimise changes of conditional be-
liefs in the belief state of the agent.
(CB) If w,w′ 6∈ Min≤JϕK, then w ≤ w
′ iff w ≤∗ϕ w
′.
Together with FAITH, postulate CB characterises a belief
change operator that is completely defined by the changes in
the minimal worlds satisfying some formulaϕ. As such, it is
fairly easy to see that no graph transformation satisfies both
FAITH and CB.
Fact 21. No relevant P-graph transformation † : G(P ) ×
L0(P )→ G(P ) satisfies both FAITH and CB.
Proof. We suppose that there is a relevant graph transforma-
tion † : G(P )×L0(P )→ G(P ) satisfying both FAITH and
CB and we will derive a contradiction. Take the preference
model M = 〈{w1, w2, w3},≤1, v〉 s.t. w1 <1 w2 <1 w3,
M,w1  ¬p ∧ q, M,w2  p ∧ ¬q and M,w3  p ∧ q. Let
G be a P-graph that inducesM . Since † satisfies both FAITH
and CB, any dynamic operator ⋆ induced by † must satisfy
that ⋆(M,p) = 〈{w1, w2, w3},≤′1, v〉 s.t. w2 <
′
1 w1 <
′
1 w3
is induced by †(G, p) = 〈Φ′,≺′〉, i.e., for any ξ ∈ Φ′ s.t.
M,w3  ξ eitherM,w1  ξ or there is ψ ∈ Φ′ s.t. ψ ≺′ ξ,
M,w1  ψ and M,w3 6 ψ and there is some ξ ∈ Φ′ s.t.
M,w1  ξ andM,w3 6 ξ.
Consider now the model M ′ = 〈{w1, w3},≤2, v〉 s.t.
w1 <2 w3 and v is the same as before. Clearly, M
′ is in-
duced by G as well. Since † satisfies both FAITH and CB,
any dynamic operator ⋆ induced by † must satisfy that
⋆(M ′, p) = 〈{w1, w3},≤′2, v〉 s.t. w3 <
′
2 w1 is induced by
†(G, p) = 〈Φ′,≺′〉. As such, for any ξ ∈ Φ′ s.t.M,w1  ξ
eitherM,w3  ξ or there is ψ ∈ Φ′ s.t. ψ ≺′ ξ,M,w3  ψ
and M,w1 6 ψ and there is some ξ ∈ Φ′ s.t. M,w3  ξ
and M,w1 6 ξ. But this is a contradiction with the previ-
ous statement, since the valuation v is the same in all mod-
els.
It is well known, however, that Natural Revision - an it-
erated revision operation proposed by Boutilier (1993) - sat-
isfies both FAITH and CB and is definable on preference
models.
Definition 22. Let M = 〈W,≤, v〉 be a preference model
and ϕ a formula of L0(P ). We say the preference model
M↑ϕ = 〈W,≤↑ϕ, v〉 is the result of the natural revision of
M by ϕ, where
w ≤↑ϕ w
′ iff
{
w ∈ Min≤JϕK, or
w ≤ w′ and w,w′ 6∈ Min≤JϕK
As such, we can conclude that Natural Revision cannot be
represented as a P-graph transformation.
Corollary 23. There is no P-graph transformation that in-
duces Natural Revision.
This result shows that some important belief change
operations are not definable through P-graph transforma-
tions. Notice that previous examples, provided by Souza et
al (2016), have all been contraction operations. What these
belief change operations have in common is that their def-
inition is intrinsically characterised by the minimal worlds
satisfying a certain formula ϕ. In other words, these oper-
ations are only well-defined on preference models if we re-
quire that preferencemodels be well-founded, a requirement
made in Souza’s (2016) definition for these models but not
in Girard’s (2008). As such, this result reinforces our intu-
ition that Fact 20 is the cause of the lack of expressibility of
P-graph transformations.
Notice that, as FAITH, postulate CB is not solely respon-
sible for the impossibility of expressing Natural Revision
through P-graph transformations. There is, in fact, a trivial
belief change operation that satisfies CB and is expressible
by P-graph transformation: the null change operation.
Definition 24. Let M = 〈W,≤, v〉 be a preference model
and ϕ a formula of L0(P ). We say the preference model
M◦ϕ = 〈W,≤, v〉 is the result of the null change ofM by ϕ
The null operation is the operation of not changing any-
thing in the agent’s belief state. It clearly satisfies postulate
CB and it is trivially induced by the null change P-graph
transformation.
Definition 25. LetG ∈ G(P ) be a P-graph and ϕ ∈ L0(P )
a propositional formula. We define the null change transfor-
mation of G by ϕ as ⊙(G,ϕ) = G.
Clearly the only dynamic operator induced by the null
change transformation ⊙ is the null change operator ◦. As
such, ⊙ satisfies postulate CB.
Related Work
The AGM approach and the vast literature based on it re-
lies mainly on extralogical characterisation of belief change
operations. The first attempt to integrate belief change op-
eration within a logic that we are aware of is the work of
Segerberg (1999), which defines Dynamic Doxastic Logic
(DDL).
Similar work has focused on embedding specific be-
lief change operations within various epistemic log-
ics to analyse dynamic phenomena in Formal Episte-
mology (Van Benthem 2007; Baltag and Smets 2008). Par-
ticularly, Girard (2008) and Van Benthem (2009) pro-
pose Dynamic Preference Logic (DPL), a dynamic logic
which has been used to generalise AGM-like belief
change operations (Liu 2011; Souza et al. 2016). Aiming to
strengthen the connection between DPL and Belief Change,
Souza, Moreira, and Vieira (2017) study how well-known
belief change postulates can be characterised using DPL ax-
ioms.
While these studies connect Belief Change with Epis-
temic Logic and provide ways to use the results from one
area within the other, their approach is mainly semantic.
Research on Belief Base Change, however, stemming from
the work of Hansson (1992), focus on constructing belief
change operators based on syntactic representations of the
agent’s belief state.
Searching for rich syntactic representations of agents’ ex-
plicit beliefs, several authors such as Williams (1994; 1995),
Rott (1991; 2009) and Benferhat et al. (2002) propose dif-
ferent belief base change operations. These works, however,
do not explore how the belief change operations constructed
over these syntactic representations are connected to the pos-
tulates of Belief Change.
The work closest to ours is that of
Delgrande, Dubois, and Lang (2006) which con-
siders the notion of iterated belief revision,
as studied by Darwiche and Pearl (1997) and
Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas (2003), as a special case
of the belief change operation of merging. The authors use
syntactic structures, similar to prioritized bases, to construct
merging operations and show that they satisfy well-known
iterated belief revision postulates. More so, the authors
propose codifications of these postulates using the syntactic
structures proposed by their work, differently than previous
work.
The main drawback of their codification of postulates, in
our opinion, is that they are not general enough. The pro-
posed codifications of the postulates are obtained by trans-
lating the desired postulates, e.g., Darwiche and Pearl’s
(1997) iterated revision postulates, using the operation of
graph prefixing to stand for revision. However, as we know,
graph prefixing does not equate revision but represents a
specific iterated revision policy known as lexicographic re-
vision. As such, a more general codification of these pos-
tulates by means of syntactic representations of the agent’s
belief state is still an open problem.
Liu (2011) has shown that preference models can
be encoded by syntactic structures known as P-graphs.
Since preference models have been used to model an
agent’s belief state (Girard 2008; Girard and Rott 2014),
Liu’s priority graphs can be seen as a syntactic repre-
sentation of an agent’s belief state as well. More yet,
Van Benthem, Grossi, and Liu (2014) and Souza (2016)
have shown that this representation can be used to construct
well-known belief changing operations from iterated belief
change literature. As before, however, the authors do not
consider how the formal properties of a belief change opera-
tor are reflected in its construction based on transformations
of priority graphs.
Conclusion
This work has explored codifications of iterated belief
change postulates in Dynamic Preference Logic using the
syntactic representation of preference models by means of
Liu’s priority structures (Liu 2011) known as P-graphs. We
provided conditions on P-graph transformations that enforce
adherence to belief change postulates of the induced dy-
namic operators.
Our work can be seen as a generalisation of previ-
ous work on the integration of Belief Revision Theory
and Dynamic Epistemic Logics that allows the use of the
DEL framework to reason about classes of belief change
operators. In some sense, this work is the complement
of the characterisation of iterated belief change postu-
lates using the proof theory of Dynamic Preference Logic
(Souza, Moreira, and Vieira 2017). We point out that, since
priority graphs can be seen as a syntactic form of rep-
resenting evidence, our work can also be connected to
the work on Evidence Logics and Explicit Knowledge
(Baltag, Fiutek, and Smets 2016; Lorini 2018).
As illustrated in SectionDeriving P-GraphTransforma-
tions from Belief Revision Policies, the characterisations
proposed provide a road-map to implement belief change
policies in computational systems. Besides, in Section Neg-
ative Results we show that a well-known iterated revision
operator cannot be encoded employing graph transforma-
tions, and we indicate which policies cannot be implemented
as syntactic transformations in the general case of using
preference models to reason about belief change.
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